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By using theoretical model and empirical analysis, we investigate how economic
integration affects the impact of welfare policies on the employment. We consider the
possibilities of financing public sector, i.e. public consumption and social security
expenses, by general labour taxation in an economy which becomes more integrated in
international product market. Increasing job mobility implies a change in the distortions
arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour which affects the
possibilities perceive in pursuing welfare policies. The effects of economic integration on
the impact of welfare policies on employment depend definitely trade-off between
intensified competition and better advantage of economies of scale. As increased trade
competition crowds out better advantage of economies of scale, it becomes more costly to
maintain welfare systems financed by labour taxation. We test the idea whether economic
integration has changed the impact of welfare policies on the employment in European
countries using data from the manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2004. Overall, the results
provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that economic integration has contributed
the distortion effects of welfare policies on the employment.
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1  INTRODUCTION
Within the past few years, the impact of the economic integration on the possibilities for
maintaining an extended welfare state, especially among Northern European countries,
and on the labour market have attracted wide interest. One of the concerns is whether it
will become more difficult to maintain a large public sector and an extended social se-
curity system, which is financed by general labour taxation. The cost of extended wel-
fare state in the international integration may be higher level of unemployment via the
distortions arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour factor. It
has been argued that in an open economy set-up equilibrium employment might be af-
fected by demand factors such as fiscal spending (see, e.g., Gatti 2002, p. 7). On the
other hand, as Rodrik (1997, 1998a) and Andersen (2002) argue, economic integration
may lead to more volatility and thus increasing need for social insurance arrangements
to ensure some income stabilization in the presence of cross-country shocks, uncertainty
and risk-aversion. However, increasing job mobility implies a change in the distortions
arising from taxes and social security contributions levied on labour which affects the
possibilities perceive in pursuing welfare policies. Thus, as Andersen (2003) argues, the
need for social insurance arrangements may increase at the same time as it becomes
more difficult to finance the system. This study addresses the second of this concern, the
problem of maintaining welfare state financed by distortionary labour taxation while
tighter economic integration affects the impact of welfare policies on the employment.
Economic integration is a process in which markets for goods and factors of produc-
tion tend to become perfectly integrated. The mobility of production has been increasing
as a consequence of product market integration. As Rodrik (1998b, 1999) argues, open
economies, which are free to trade with each other, differ from closed economies in the
respect that in particular capital and employers are internationally mobile. However,
capital income taxation contributes a relative small proportion of total tax revenue in
most European countries which suggest that the mobility of certain tax bases has not a
major role for possibility of financing welfare policies in economic integration. On the
other hand, product demand will become more sensitive to price differentials between
2different countries and firms’ location decisions more responsive to relative labour
costs. Therefore, competitiveness pressure on the labour market towards greater flexibil-
ity is expected to increase under diminishing trade barriers. Hence, it is more natural to
address the question of how product market integration affects the consequences of wel-
fare state financed by general labour taxation, although workers are immobile. The im-
pact of welfare policies on employment with economic integration depend definitely
trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of economies of scale.
The progress of integration with the wider trade and capital flows has been strengthen-
ing the competition between EU countries, which has reflected in the link between wage
formation and unemployment. With unionized labour markets a permanent increase in
labour income taxation leads the union to demand higher real wage to compensate for
the decreased after tax income, and consequence of higher labour costs firms demand
labour less.1 Hence, it can be argued that the possibilities of welfare state to improve
employment through fiscal activities is progressively reduced when product market
competition increases i.e., the “optimal” level of public spending decreases as a conse-
quence of increased product market competition. On the other hand, with increased in-
tegration and competition firms with access to the wider market were expected to be
able to expand sales and production to take better advantage of economies of scale
while continuing to cover production costs despite lower price-cost margins. Thus, mar-
ket power may arise from specialization in production and differentiation of products to
establish segmented markets. This might decrease the costs of maintain welfare sys-
tems. Since product market elasticity with product price is likely to rise with integration,
this implies that, with greater trade openness, we should see in turn an increase in costs
of maintain welfare systems. As increased trade competition crowds out better advan-
tage of economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems fi-
nanced by labour taxation.
The purpose of this study is to examine by using theoretical model and empirical
analysis how economic integration affects the impact of welfare policies on the em-
1 In contrast to competitive labour markets, in the presence of unions the burden of labour taxation will be
borne in part by employers and will therefore increase labour costs even if the labour supply is perfectly
inelastic. How weak is the impact of increased labour income taxation on wages depends on how highly
centralized union-government negotiations are to internalize the effects of higher taxes on more public
goods or higher transfers (see, e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Alesina and Perotti 1997).
3ployment. To consider this issue, we need first of all to clarify the effects of welfare
state activities and labour taxation on wage formation and employment. Then, we have
to examine how these effects depend on how integrated international product market is.
In order to study this issue we use a model with three main characteristics. First, we
consider an open economy with two sectors: tradable sector and public sector. Second,
we suppose that labour markets are unionized which generates rigidities in the wage
setting process. The third feature is that we consider differentiated goods produced by
monopolistically competitive firms. While the effects of economic integration can work
through many different channels, product markets and factor substitution, in this study
the economic integration is mainly associated with market power which makes it possi-
ble to capture the main quality effects in a manageable way. Finally, the empirical aim
is to determine whether European integration has changed the impact of welfare policies
on the employment. This has been tested using data from the European countries from
1975 to 2004.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model for empiri-
cal analysis. It specifies some basic mechanisms determining how increased integration
affects the impact of welfare policies on the employment. Section 3 set up the econo-
metric model while the data is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the estimation
strategy, and reports on the empirical results. The last section concludes the study.
2  THE THEORY
2.1  A Two-sector model
We consider an open economy with two sectors, traded private sector and non-traded
public sector. There are many firms n at private sector producing tradable differentiated
products with capital and labour as inputs. We suppose that there is another sector, a
public sector producing the non-tradable goods only for domestic market. Supposing
that product markets are imperfectly competitive, there is monopolistic competition in
4tradable good markets adapting the model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).2 The structure of
this model is such that consumers demand a variety of differentiated tradable products
and non-tradable public goods. Representative consumer's tastes are assumed repre-
sented by the utility function
(2.1) GdLDbV T +-= q
q
1
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=
=
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 is an index of consumption of the differentiated tradable products, G
is consumption of the public goods, b is the positive constant, and d captures the dis-
utility of work TL . Consumers supply labour from which they receive wage income if
employed, and unemployment benefits if unemployed.3  Each consumer maximises
their utility function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint. The budget constraint simply
requires that the value of expenditure is not more than value of the income:
TRIDP +=*  where TR is lump-sum transfers from the government, I labour income,
and *P  represents an index of the price level in terms of international integration. La-
bour income is wtI w )1( -=  if employed, and I = s if unemployed where wt  is the wage
tax rate, and s is the unemployment benefit.
By imposing the symmetry assumption a consumer maximizing will set
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e  is the product-demand elasticity. The product-demand elasticity can
be thought as an increasing function of the number of products ( )nee = , where
2 This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm has some
power over the pricing of its product.
3 Note that d has interpretation of a reservation wage i.e., for any after tax wage above d the consumer
supplies inelastically its working time (normalized to unity), which is a reasonable approximation to the
fact that labour supply elasticity is usually found to be small.
5( ) 0>¢ ne , and n  is the number of products/firms. An increase in the number of firms
leads to an increase in the degree of competition. The demand of products type i is
given as
(2.3)
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where ip  represents the price of variety i with 1>f  denoting the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two products types (see Helpman and Krugman 1989). The elasticity
of substitution among differentiated goods can be thought as a decreasing function of
the advantage of economies of scale ( )aff = , where ( ) 0<¢ af , and *A
Aa º  is an ex-
ogenous comparative productivity for domestic tradable sector relative to foreign. A
growth in the advantage of economies of scale leads to a decrease in the degree of sub-
stitution among differentiated goods within sector.4
The effects on imperfectly competitive product markets of increased integration via
declining trade costs are basically of two counteracting sorts. Hence, it turns out to vary
competition by varying both advantage of economies of scale holding e  constant, and
number of firms holding f  constant. Let t  denotes a trade cost due to transactions
costs and other trade barriers related to foreign trade.5 First, individual producers with
access to the wider market were expected to be able to expand production to take better
advantage of economies of scale, i.e., 0>
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
f a
a
. This has associated to reduced market
imperfection and to increased incentive of product-differentiating. Second, market entry
becomes easier and/or less costly implying that more goods become traded goods. With
4 Together with interaction between number of products/firms and degree of price competition, trade and
economic integration can be seen as the result of the interaction between product differentiation and
economies of scale. Each industry contains a large, but limited because of economies of scale, number of
potential differentiated products that consumers regard as imperfect substitutes. Given the opportunity to
trade, industries will specialize in the production of different ranges, while the degree of price competi-
tion will increase.
5 For simplicity, we assume that the trade costs of import and export outputs are equal.
6increased integration and competition, an firm’s market share becomes increasingly
sensitive to price changes raising the elasticity of the consumption price i.e., 0<
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
e n
n
.
In the imperfect competition, we have then the condition of pricing rule for products
types
(2.4)
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In optimum, the price equals to the marginal revenue from exporting, where we must
have that relative trade cost equals to mark-up factor i.e.
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Helpman and Krugman 1989, p. 18). We summarize the characterization of the optimal
pricing rule in
Proposition  1 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher number of firms
and in consequence of its higher elasticity of product demand will reduce the mark-up
price, whereas better advantage of economies of scale and in consequence of its lower
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products will raise it, ceteris paribus.
The government provides public goods and social security in the form of transfers re-
lated to unemployment and other lump-sum subsidies. Public demand for product vari-
ety j is associated price index of non-tradable domestic market by
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 where
”¯ ” indicates a public sector. Government faces a downward sloping public demand
curve
(2.5) x-= pG
where x  is the demand elasticity of public goods implying that public demand for prod-
uct variety j can be written
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Note that this way of specifying public consumption, as Andersen (2003) argues, rules
out relative demand shifts between public and private consumption as a source of rela-
tive price changes.6 We assume for simplicity that there is not tax rate on capital, and
the unemployment benefit is not taxable income. Hence, the taxes are levied only on
labour capturing the empirical fact that general labour taxation (wage tax rate wt  and
social security contributions pt )  accounts for most of public sector revenue. Let N be
the labour force, and thus [N – TL ] is unemployment where TL  is total employment.
Then we can write the budget constraint of government as:
(2.7) TTT LwtSTRGP =++ )(
where Tw  refers total wage rates, TR is total expenses to transfers, and S = s(N – TL ) is
total expenses on unemployment benefits. Consequently, the labour tax rates
)( pw
T ttt +º  are endogenous adjusting so as to balance the budget.
The firm considers the gross wage of private sector w~  as given consisting of the net-
of-tax wage7  plus the social security contributions pt , so that wtw p )1(~ += . For exam-
ple, an increase in employer’s social security contributions shifts the labour demand
curve inward by increasing the cost of labour (see, e.g., Pissarides 1998). As Holmlund
et al. (1989) explain if there is complete nominal wage rigidity, employment takes the
whole burden of adjustment.8 Assuming that linear-homogenous technology can be rep-
6 Since we consider the distortion effects of welfare activities this assumption simplifies to isolate the
direct effects disregarding any relative price effects that may arise if the distribution of income affects
aggregate demand.
7 A rise in wage tax increases the labour costs when a rise of wage tax is compensated by an increase in
the negotiated wages.
8 If there is correspondingly complete nominal wage flexibility, the increase in social security contribu-
tions is completely shifted back on wages.
8resented in traded sector by CES (constant elasticity of substitution)9 production func-
tion form, it can be specified as
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capital is denoted by K. The elasticity of substitution is defined as the effect of a change
in relative factor prices on relative inputs of these two factors, holding output constant
(see Allen 1938, or Hamermesh 1993). The conditional labour costs can be derived as
(2.9)
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We assume imperfect competition in the product market i.e., each single firm faces a
downward sloping demand curve
(2.10) )()( ef +-== ppDY .
The closer substitutes for output Y on the international market are the more elastic out-
put demand becomes. Profit maximization implies that the firms will set a price, which
exceeds the marginal cost by a constant mark-up factor, i.e. 1
1
>
-+
+
ef
ef
. In a process
of integration, there are pressures for the mark-ups to decline with increasing elasticity
of product demand.10 On the other hand, a decrease in the product-substitution elasticity
9 The CES function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, trade may give rise to take advantage of
economies of scale in production.
10 Whenever an economy faces a larger number of firms in an integrated world market, trade itself leads
to a decline in the mark-ups. Hence, the degree of competition tends to increase when more goods be-
come traded. By increasing competition facing individual firms in product markets, it is intended that
firms should lower their mark-ups of prices over marginal costs. For instance, Hoon (2001) has affirmed
that as domestic and foreign firms compete in the markets for traded goods, there are pressures for the
mark-ups to decline.
9may compensate this effect.11 Under the assumption of wage taking behaviour labour
demand can be written by using equations (2.9) and (2.10)
(2.11) sef -+-= wpL ~)( .
The labour market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive. It is commonly ac-
cepted that the monopoly union model in a simple way (see, e.g., Booth 1995) captures
the qualitative implications of different labour market models at least in respect to gen-
erate unemployment, and in the wage response to wage income taxation and the degree
of centralization. Wages is set by trade union, and it is assumed that union is large
enough to be able to negotiate over wages, but small enough to take welfare policy as
given. Union maximize the income of their members subject to the labour demand func-
tion (2.11).  Union’s objective function is given by
(2.12) sLNwtL w )()1( -+-=W .
Maximization of (2.12) with respect to wage rate yields an equation for the equilibrium
wages
(2.13)
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LLh is elasticity of labour demand with wages. For simplicity, in the
present setting, unemployment benefits are not taxable income.12 Considering how
wages respond to changes in welfare activities, we find that for unemployment benefits
there is both a direct effect in terms of raising the reservation wage of workers, 0>
¶
¶
s
w ,
11 For example, Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) conclude using Italian firm level data that EU Single
Market Program has lead to a decrease in the mark-up and an increase in productivity for those firms that
were expected, ex-ante, to be more sensitive to the abolition of external trade barriers.
12 It is well-known that the effect of unemployment benefits for wage formation depends on whether
unemployment benefits are taxes by the same rate as wages or not (Pissarides 1998).
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and an indirect effect in terms of raising tax rate, 0>
¶
¶
wt
w . These results capture the
standard result (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997) that an increase in public sector
activities may lead to a wage increase. For simplicity, in the present setting, it is as-
sumed that trade union is small enough to take welfare policy as given, but how weak is
this impact on wages depends on how highly centralized union-government negotiations
are to internalize the effects of higher taxes on more public goods or higher transfers
(see, e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988). As Summers et al. (1993) suggest, one may con-
jecture that if wage setting is centralised and workers are represented by a very large
trade union, then they are likely to develop a more moderate attitude in negotiations,
and union would take into account the budgetary implications of unemployment subsi-
dies.13 Wages would thus be set to a lower level. Although, our trade union is large
enough to set wages, but not large enough to negotiate over welfare policy with the
government, this implies that looking at the empirical determinants of employment
countries might be partitioned in groups with patterns of wage negotiations.
A key parameter for wage rates between sectors is the elasticity of labour demand.
There is a qualitative difference between the traded and non-traded sectors, since the
latter have the possibility of passing an increase in wages partly into prices while this is
not possible in the former case. Hence, we assume that labour demand is less elastic in
public sector as compared tradable firms in private sector. We have then the condition
of wage rule for sectors
(2.14)
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reflecting that the competitive pressure is higher in traded firms, and therefore the
wages may not be higher in private sector than public sector. Rodrik (1997) argues that,
since the demand for labour is a derived demand, which varies proportionately with the
elasticity of demand for goods, the integration of goods markets alone makes the de-
13 Summers et al. (1993) define centralised wage setting as unions’ ability to perceive the government
budget constraint i.e., to be aware of a linkage between taxes and benefits received. They suggest that
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mand for domestic labour more elastic because of declining mark-ups.14 Then, with
heightened foreign competition the unions face more elastic labour demand relation and
thus moderate their wage demands ( 0<
¶
¶
LL
w
h
). For example, Huizinga (1993), and Dan-
thine and Hunt (1994) find that the creation of firm level competition increases the elas-
ticity of labour demand which moderates union’s wage demand i.e., increased goods
market competition leads lower wages and then higher employment. However, the ef-
fect of integration on the price sensitivity of the market share may be compensated by
its direct effect on the market share i.e., market power can arise from specialization in
production and differentiation of products being able to take better advantage of econo-
mies scale with segmented markets. Nickell et al. (1994), and Stewart (1990) find evi-
dence of a positive (time series) relationship between wages and market share. This
suggests that the sharing of mark-ups and of higher wages being associated with market.
We summarize the effects of integration on wages for private sector in
Proposition  2 Lower trade costs with increased integration, higher number of firms
and in consequence of its higher elasticity of product demand ( 0<
¶
¶
¶
¶
t
e n
n
) will in-
crease the elasticity of labour demand ( 0>
¶
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e
hLL ) and thus decrease wages pressure
( 0<
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h
), whereas better advantage of economies of scale and in consequence of its
lower elasticity of substitution between differentiated products ( 0>
¶
¶
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t
f a
a
) will de-
crease the labour-demand elasticity ( 0>
¶
¶
f
hLL ) and thus increase wages ( 0<
¶
¶
LL
w
h
).
labour taxation is less distorting with respect to labour supply decisions in countries with more centralised
wage bargaining.
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Given the equilibrium wage rate (2.13) and labour costs wtw p )1(~ += , we have equi-
librium employment for traded sector by using equation (2.11)
(2.15)
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We see that an increase in the elasticity of product demand triggered by more firms (i.e.,
e  rises) decreases the labour demand ( 0<
¶
¶
e
L ). Product demand becomes more price
elastic when product markets are more integrated, but is the effect of product market
integration on the price sensitivity of the market share larger than its direct effect on the
market share. For example, individual firms with access to the wider market might be
able to expand sales and production taking better advantage of economies scale (i.e., f
falls) which can be associated to decreased market imperfection and thus increased la-
bour demand ( 0<
¶
¶
f
L ). Furthermore, when the unions face more elastic labour demand
relation and thus moderate their wage demands ( 0<
¶
¶
LL
w
h
), we find that increased la-
bour-demand elasticity increase labour demand ( 0>
¶
¶
LL
L
h
) due to the reduced market
power of unions. Accordingly, if unions are less aggressive passing increases in wage
taxes and unemployment benefits into wages implying better employment, these points
out that economic integration may imply an implicit structural reform of labour markets
through the effects it has on union market power.15 However, as Andersen (2003) ar-
14 Applying one of the four Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, the demand for anything is likely to
be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing, which it contributes to produce
(Hicks 1966, p. 242).
15 Rodrik (1997) explains when the shock of product market is a negative one; there is a larger decrease in
employment in the more open economy than there is in the more closed economy. A consequence of
integration is greater instability in labour-market outcomes when openness magnifies the effects of shocks
on labour demand. An inward shift and a flattening of the demand curve for labour reduce average earn-
ings. Increased trade makes it more costly for workers to achieve a high level of labour standards and
benefits. The larger the elasticity of demand for labour, the higher the share of any such costs that must be
borne by the workers themselves.
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gues, even though international integration may reduce the distortionary effects of un-
employment benefits and taxation on wage formation it does not necessarily follow the
distortionary effects on employment are reduced. In addition, in the process of integra-
tion international trade can increase the elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital. As Rodrik (1997) argues, the increasing mobility of capital means that the de-
mand for labour will generally be more responsive to changes in the factor prices. Firms
can substitute other factors of production for immobile workers more easily by invest-
ing. We find that in consequence of decreased trade costs as substitutability increases
(i.e., s  rises) labour demand becomes more sensitive to labour costs. Hence, despite
the wage moderation the employment consequences may become larger because tighter
integration increases the sensitivity of employment to wage costs. We summarize the
characterization of the impact of economic integration on distortionary employment
effects in
Proposition  3 As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of econo-
mies of scale,
t
e
t
f
¶
¶
¶
¶
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¶ n
n
a
a
, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour increases, 0<
¶
¶
t
s
, in the process of economic integration, the larger are distor-
tionary effects of welfare policies on employment, the less centralized is the wage for-
mation process.
Consider the equilibrium employment in the non-traded public sector. Similarly, for
public sector it follows
(2.16)
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We can see that, in this framework, economic integration does not affect on public em-
ployment neither via the scale effects of integration nor through increasing labour-
demand elasticity. Furthermore, in the non-traded sector, it is possible to pass through
an increase in wages partly into prices while this is not possible in the traded sector
14
( ex < ). However, public consumption improving public employment16 is able to affect
firm’s competitiveness via the labour taxation (the distortion) financing increased ex-
penditures (using the budget constrain of government (2.7)). The impact of increased
public expenditures on international competitiveness results from the negative effects of
labour taxes on the disposable income. The loss of competitiveness via higher labour
costs causes a reduction in the demand for exports and a fall in private employment.
This means that, if an increase in wage taxes is compensated by higher wages or an in-
crease in employers’ social security payments cause an increase in labour costs, eco-
nomic integration worsens the ability of government in improving employment via wel-
fare policy when competition crowds out public consumption. Besides, in non-traded
sector, an increase in labour taxation and no cuts on public wages replace partly the
positive impact of public consumption on public employment ( 0>
¶
¶
G
L ) by the opposite
effects of higher labour costs ( 0~ <¶
¶
w
L ) depending on how centralized labour market are.
It is less costly to maintain welfare activities, if labour markets are highly centralized.17
In summary, increasing job mobility implies a change in the distortions arising from
taxes and social security contributions levied on labour which affects the possibilities
perceive in pursuing welfare policies, i.e. public consumption and social security ex-
penses, in an economy which becomes more integrated in international product market.
The effects of economic integration on the impact of welfare policies on employment
depend definitely trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of
economies of scale. As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of
economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by
labour taxation.
16 The government demands labour to produce public goods. This captures that for most countries, as
Andersen (2001) explains, employment constitutes the major part of public consumption, and wage costs
are the dominant expenditure item.
17 Empirical support for the importance of this mechanism has recently been provided by Alesina and
Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
15
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Our empirical aim is to test whether economic integration has changed the impact of
welfare policies on the employment looking at a panel of European countries. The strat-
egy is to take the theoretical model in Section 2 as a basis for econometric identifica-
tion. In particular, we use the equilibrium conditions for employment in traded and non-
traded sector. Let itl  be the employment rate in country i and time t. Taking a linear
approximation of equations (2.15) and (2.16) aggregate employment for each period can
be written as a regression function
(3.1) ititititwitit egtrytl it +++++= )()()()()( crbmwa
where w is real labour price, wt  wage-based tax rate, y real GDP index, tr ratio of gov-
ernment transfers to GDP, and g ratio of government wage-based consumption to GDP.
The error terms are denoted e. Supposing that the scale returns are constant we estimate
constant-output labour price of employment using restricted least squares procedure,
1=b  with constant output.18 By estimating levels, it is assumed that there are no sig-
nificant time lags between the changes of labour prices and the employment responses.
Hamermesh (1983) reports that typical adjustment lags are six months to one year, so in
the annual data lags should not be too important at the country level.
Supposing that the scale returns are not constant we estimate non-constant-output co-
efficients of the labour price. If both scale and constant-output labour prices are consis-
tently estimated, then the difference between these two is the estimate of the scale ef-
fects, and it would provide indirect evidence about the competitiveness of product mar-
ket. Thus, it can be determined the impact of integration’s scale effects on the impact of
welfare policies on the employment by controlling demand factors. To estimate scale
effect labour price of employment for each period, this suggests the following regres-
sion equation
18 In the short run, a changes in the costs of labour will induce a change in output, i.e. the estimates of
labour price includes the scale effects. The long run labour price would be estimated without production
measurement or with output as constant. (See, e.g., Hamermesh 1986, p. 449.)
16
(3.2) ititititwitit ugtrytl it +++++F= )()()()()( crbmw
Here u is an error term. The scale effect b  measures the impact of international demand
shock on employment. We use two different instrument variables: the share of country’s
i exports to the other EU-countries in production and the share of the country’s i output
of European Union in production which are deflated by a price competitiveness indica-
tor. The first attempts to measure foreign demand of country’s products, and the second
attempts to measure the overall demand of European Union. Furthermore, a price com-
petitiveness indicator measures the international product market competition.
Table 4.1 Coverage, density and co-ordination of labour relations in EU-countries.
Country Union Density Union Coverage
Index
Co-ordination:
Union
Co-ordination:
Employer
NOR-group
Austria 46.2 3 3 3
Denmark 71.4 3 3 3
Finland 72.0 3 2 3
Sweden 82.5 3 3 3
CON-group
Belgium 51.2 3 2 2
France 9.8 3 2 2
Germany 32.9 3 2 3
Greece
Italy 38.8 3 2 2
Luxembourg
Netherlands 25.5 3 2 2
Portugal 31.8 3 2 2
Spain 11.0 3 2 1
BRIT-group
Ireland 49.7 3 1 1
United Kingdom 39.1 2 1 1
Notes: (1) Coverage measures the extent to which contracts signed by organised unions extend to the rest
of the labour force. (2) Density measures the rates of net union density, i.e., the number of union members
net of pensioners divided by the labour force. (3) Co-ordination measures the extent of contracting co-
ordination within different union and employers organisations. The index provides a qualitative ranking
of countries: 1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high.
Sources: OECD Jobs Study (1994), Nickell (1997), and Golden (1996).
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To measure the degree of centralisation of labour markets, we use the indexes con-
structed by OECD Jobs Study (1994) for coverage ratio, Golden (1996) for union den-
sity, and Nickell (1997) for co-ordination, which are reported in Table 4.1. These in-
dexes rank EU-countries in order of centralisation. We partition countries in three
groups19: the NOR-group includes Scandinavian countries, and Austria, where trade
unions are large and centralised; the CON-group includes countries (except Austria) in
continental Europe, where unions play an important role but are decentralised; and the
BRIT-group includes Ireland and United Kingdom, where labour markets are quite
competitive. We allow the wage-based tax rate coefficient to vary across these groups of
EU-countries by multiplying wt  by three dummy variables taking a value of unity if the
country belongs to the group and zero otherwise.
4  DATA
The employment equations are estimated using panel data of European countries20
based on the statistics of OECD database sources: OECD Statistics of International
Trade, OECD Taxing Wages Statistics, OECD Productivity Database, OECD National
Accounts Statistics, and OECD Economic Outlook Database. The panel data covers
years from 1975 to 2004. Table 4.2 reports summary statistics of the observations. Es-
timation requires measures of employment, real labour price, labour taxation, govern-
ment transfers, government consumption and real production for all country-year obser-
vations. The deflating variable is a producer price index. Employment rate comes di-
rectly from OECD Economic Outlook Database as a share of workers in labour force.
Real average labour price is constructed as a unit labour cost equals nominal annual
wages plus social security costs paid by employers deflated by the producer price index
and divided by the number of workers. Employment is supposed to depend on the la-
19 This classification is suggested by several previous studies (Blanchard 1997, Bruno and Sachs 1985,
Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Cameron 1984, Daveri and Tabellini 2000, Layard et al. 1991, Nickell and
Layard 1999).
20 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
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bour costs negatively. The higher are labour price, the slighter is the labour demand.
Labour tax rate includes direct average taxation plus social security payments paid by
employees divided by total wages. We expect real wages to increase with the labour tax
rate. This effect could be small, if the labour markets are much centralised, and thus the
negative impact of higher labour tax rate on employment could be small. If trade unions
play an important role in wage negotiations, but are not so centralised as to take into
account the repercussions of higher wages, we expect the negative effect on employ-
ment to be large. The cross-sectional variation in the employment rates is dominated by
fixed effects at the country level. Labour market legislation differs markedly across
countries but has not changed much since the 1970s (Nickell, 1997). Thus, as Daveri
and Tabellini (2000) argue, the correlation between labour taxes and employment is
only captured by simultaneously exploiting the time series and cross-country variations
of the data, and by distinguishing among countries on the basis of their labour market
institutions.
The data of government expenditures based on OECD National Accounts Statistics.
The ratio of government transfers to GDP includes public expenditure on unemploy-
ment subsidies and other social transfers. It is supposed that the unemployment benefits
decrease employment. However, the evidence of Nickell and Layard (1999) suggests
that the unemployment benefits seem to have little impact on overall labour input.
While high benefits lead to high unemployment, they also lead to high participation
because they make participation in the labour market more attractive i.e., participation
being necessary to be eligible for the high benefits. This is consistent with a weak im-
pact of unemployment benefit on employment ratio, because the higher unemployment
effect and the higher labour market participation effect tend to cancel out. It is not clear
that the size of net effect should also depend on trade union strength and centralisation,
since even in competitive labour markets higher replacement rates could have a large
effect on employment through individual search or bargaining attitudes. Finally, we also
expect that employment rate depends on ratio of government wage-based consumption
to GDP positively. Although, public consumption improving public employment is able
to affect country’s competitiveness via the increasing distortions of labour taxation fi-
nancing increased expenditures.
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Table 4.2 Variable summary statistics.
Variable    Obs          Mean      Std. Dev.      Min          Max
GDP-index (real)    450          76.12        18.69        28.02        118.2
Employment rate    450          92.97        3.698  81.56        99.82
Labour price (real)    450          73.58        28.07  2.670        116.9
Labour tax rate    450          17.38        10.07        0.040        44.39
Ratio of transfers (real)    450          0.226        0.112        0.007        0.499
Ratio of public consumption (real)    450          0.143        0.066        0.009        0.388
Exports share (real)    450          0.016        0.015  0.0001      0.083
EU-output share (real)    450          0.067        0.093  0.0003      0.687
For the equation (3.2), we use two different instrument variables: the share of coun-
try’s exports to the other EU-countries in production and the share of the country’s out-
put of European Union in production deflated by the country’s price competitiveness
indicator. Country’s exports to the other EU-countries and price competitiveness indica-
tor are based on Foreign Trade OECD Statistics. Another instrument variable, the pro-
duction of European countries is based on OECD National Accounts Statistics. Real
GDP index, another of endogenous variables, comes directly from the data of productiv-
ity. A rise in exports increases country’s production, which is supposed to increase the
employment. In theory, the labour demand is supposed to depend on the output posi-
tively. If product demand rises and thus production increases, the firms’ demand for
factors rises. The assumption is that higher export signals better scale economies (or less
foreign competition).21 On the other hand, the more the rest of the EU accounts for the
output of country, the more competitive the product market is for this country’s firms.
Finally, an increase in the competitiveness indicator means that an country’s price com-
petitive ability decrease is supposed to decrease the product demand and thus employ-
ment.
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5  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical study of the effects of fiscal policy in open economies has typically fo-
cused on the role of government purchases of goods and services and on its effects on
the relative price of non-tradables. Papers by Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio,
Giovannini and Krueger (1994), and De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) finds
empirical support of different degrees that an increase in government spending on goods
and services, falling more heavily on labour-intensive non-tradable goods, leads to an
appreciation of the relative price of non-tradable goods via an increase in the demand
for labour. Concerning empirical studies on the intersection of public finance and labour
economics, several contributions have looked at the effects of taxation on unemploy-
ment, particularly in closed economies. For example, paper by Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) finds that the increase in unemployment and the slowdown in economic growth
are related, because of higher taxes on labour. Recent research by Kiander et al. (2004)
analyses the relationship between unemployment, labour taxation and public spending
using a panel data of OECD countries. Their estimation results suggest that the coun-
tries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less exten-
sively in financing welfare spending compared to countries with centralised or decen-
tralised bargaining.
The empirical work closest to this study is the one conducted by Alesina and Perotti
(1997). They use a model of open economy to study the effects of government expendi-
tures and distortionary taxation on competitiveness using a panel data of 14 OECD
countries from 1960 to 1990. They find that an increase in government transfers fi-
nanced by labour taxation generate a loss of international price competitiveness. How-
ever, their study does not focus on how the competitiveness of product market affects
employment. This study is the first to estimate how economic integration affects the
impact of welfare policies on the employment using panel data of EU-countries.
21 Péridy (2004) finds using data of four EU countries over the period 1975 - 2000 that exports unambi-
guously rise with the degree of scale economies.
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5.1  Estimation strategy
There are some issues to mention regarding the estimation strategy. One is the exogene-
ity of the regressors in the equation (3.1) and (3.2). As Hamermesh (1986) discusses,
some of them might actually be endogenous variables because firms (government) make
their output (wage-based consumption) and employment decisions jointly. Quandt and
Roser (1989) estimated an equilibrium model of the labour market, and used it to test
the assumption of production exogeneity. They did not reject the assumption that pro-
duction is exogenous. On the other hand, not only because of this potential problem, we
estimate both of constant-output labour price of employment by using least squares, and
scale effect labour price of employment by using controls as instruments and by suppos-
ing that production is endogenous. Furthermore, there is potential source of spurious
correlation due to the possibility of endogeneity of labour tax rates and unemployment
benefits. For instance, a common EU-wide shock that decreased employment could
have forced to increase tax rates to pay for increased unemployment benefits. Because
of this potential correlation problem, we construct variable of government transfers ex-
penditures rate to GDP including both of unemployment subsidies and other social
transfers, and labour tax rate is wage-based.22 If some regressors are endogenous, then
least-squares parameter estimates will suffer endogeneity bias, the net direction of
which is not clear.23
A third issue is that the income tax system is progressive and income tax brackets are
in general not indexed. During periods of high inflation many taxpayers tend to be
pushed up to higher brackets merely because their nominal income increases. As a re-
sult, the average tax rate increases. When wage and price inflation are correlated, this
effect might bias our estimates of the coefficient of the average tax rate. On the other
hand, Alesina and Perotti (1997) find that excluding high-inflation years doesn’t affect
22 To cope with this possible endogeneity of these variables, we also estimated the specifications by re-
placing current values of labour tax rate and the ratio of transfers with their lagged values, but it shown
that lagged estimators result in insignificant estimates. As Kiviet (1995) suggests, when a model for panel
data includes lagged dependent explanatory variables, then the estimation procedures are asymptotically
valid only when the number of observations in the time dimension gets large. However, our set of data
has restricted sample size both of in the cross-section dimension and time dimension.
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the coefficients of the tax variable. A fourth issue is that the positive relationship be-
tween the labour tax rate and unit labour costs might be influenced by the fact that two
highly correlated variables appear at the denominator and the numerator in estimating
equations (3.1) - (3.2). If variation in wages dominates the behaviour of unit labour
costs and of the tax rate, one should expect that negative relation between these two will
be picked up by our estimates. As Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue, if instead the esti-
mated effect of the tax rate is still negative, one can feel confident that the relation being
estimated is not caused by the way we constructed the tax variable.24 Because of this
potential correlation problem, we estimate the specifications in the dynamic model with
lagged value of unit labour costs.
Supposing that integration has influenced on the effects of welfare policies, it is also
necessary to determine the effects of welfare policies on employment for periods before
integration and during process of integration; so we divide time series into two periods:
1975-1989, and 1990-2004. We first estimate the employment equations in levels by
OLS and GLS using common intercepts over countries. Labour market institutions are
important determinants of employment. As Daveri and Tabellini (2000) argue, institu-
tions are hard to measure and they differ a lot across countries, but have changed only
very slowly over time. Hence, the appropriate estimation method is by fixed effects i.e.,
with country-specific intercepts which can proxy for institutions. Thus, we estimate the
employment equation in levels by OLS with country dummies as intercepts. Although,
taking time differences also controls for unobserved time-invariant country fixed effects
influencing the employment level. However, time-differencing can also aggravate re-
gressor measurement error and result in inconsistent estimates.25 Hsiao (1986) argues
that if variables are indeed subject to measurement errors, exploiting panel data to con-
trol for the effects of unobserved individual characteristics using standard differenced
estimators may result in even more biased estimates than simple OLS estimators using
23 Because the endogenous variable is correlated with the disturbance, the least squares estimators of the
parameters of equations with endogenous variables on the right-hand side are inconsistent (see, e.g.,
Greene, 2000).
24 We also estimated the specifications with rate of wage tax to GDP, but it shown no difference of results
between constructed wage tax variables.
25 We also estimated the specifications with all variables measured in first differences, but it shown that
differenced estimators result in more biased estimates. Taking into account our data restrictions we didn’t
take longer differences.
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cross-sectional data alone. We start by estimating the employment equations in levels.
For the equations (3.1), to estimate constant-output labour price of employment we use
ordinary least squares estimation with fixed effect (OLS) and generalized least squares
estimation (GLS); and for the equations (3.2), to estimate scale effect labour price of
employment we apply instrumental variables estimation (2SLS and G2SLS). In fact,
when we adopt GLS estimation procedure, it allows for heteroscedasticity with cross
section correlation.26 Then, we proceed with the generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation, which provides a convenient framework for obtaining consistent
and at least asymptotically efficient estimators for the dynamic panel data (Bond,
2002).27 More specifically, the equations (3.1) were estimated using the first-differenced
GMM method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method estimates the
model in first differences but uses the lagged variables in levels as instruments. The
equations (3.2) were estimated using the first-differenced instrumental variables (IV)
estimation applying FD2SLS for dynamic panel data with lagged employment rate and
lagged value of unit labour costs.
5.2  Estimation results
Our results for specifications by estimating levels are presented in table 5.1. In column 1
and 2, is reported estimated constant-output labour price of employment for total period
1975-2004, and sub-periods 1975-1989 and 1990-2004. Furthermore, in column 3 and
4, is reported estimated scale effect labour price of employment. The results are inde-
pendent on whether we estimate specifications by OLS with fixed effect or GLS. In all
26 The heteroskedasticity means that the variances of the error terms are not constant across observations,
but may arise with the value of observation. Thus, the estimators are not efficient. (See, e.g., Greene,
2000.) Anderson (1993) explains controlling for heteroskedasticity would require weighting observations
which estimated elasticities are relatively imprecise. The logic of weighted least squares (WLS) is that
observations with smaller variances receive a larger weight and therefore have greater influence in the
estimates; similarly, observations with greater variances receive a smaller weight and therefore have
smaller influence in the estimates (Greene 2000, p. 512).
27 Comparing results of the different estimation method between Daveri and Tabellini (2000), which es-
timate unemployment equation both of in levels by OLS and in first difference by OLS and GLS, and
Kiander et al. (2004) estimating unemployment equation by dynamic method (GMM), suggests that un-
employment is positively correlated with labour tax rates in Europe. Their estimated coefficients differ
somewhat because of different used set of countries, classification of countries, set of variables, and time
period.
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these regressions, the coefficients of the labour price have the expected sign, and they
are statistically significant. The estimated value of the labour price is also relatively
stable across different models. If both constant-output and scale-effect labour price of
employment are consistently estimated then the difference between these two is an es-
timate of the scale effect. It is shown that the difference between constant-output and
scale-effect labour price of employment don’t become nearer an estimate of the scale
effect over integration by estimating levels. However, coefficients of scale effects have
the expected sign, and they are statistically significant. Our results for specifications by
using dynamic panel data estimation are presented in table 5.2. In column 5, is reported
estimated constant-output labour price of employment for total period and sub-periods,
and in column 6, is reported estimated scale effect labour price of employment. Con-
trary to results in levels, by using GMM and FD2SLS methods, we find that the differ-
ence between constant-output and scale-effect labour price of employment become
nearer an estimate of the scale effect over integration. Comparing first and last sub-
period, we find that the negative impact of labour price on the employment have in-
creased over integration with constant output, but have decreased allowing scale effects
appear. This may imply that economic integration has caused on implicit structural re-
form of labour markets through the effects it has on union market power, i.e. moderat-
ing wage demands to improve employment.
The basic result is that scale effects strengthen the negative impact of labour tax rate
on the employment. Comparing constant-output and scale effect estimations, the coeffi-
cients of labour tax rate in generally have unexpected sign without integration effect,
and expected sign by using instruments. However, magnitude of the parameter is not
stable across different models. There is for total and both sub-periods some coefficients
of unexpected sign and/or statistically insignificant by using GMM and FD2SLS meth-
ods. Furthermore, by using both method in levels, there is for first sub-period some co-
efficients of unexpected sign, and they are statistically insignificant. This negative rela-
tionship between the labour tax rate and unit labour costs might be influenced by the
fact that two highly correlated variables appear at the denominator and the numerator. If
variation in wages dominates the behaviour of unit labour costs and of the tax rate, one
should expect that negative relation between these two will be picked up by our esti-
mates.
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Table 5.1 Regression results for employment (in levels).
Method
Equation (3.1)
OLS
Equation (3.1)
GLS
Equation (3.2)
2SLS
Equation (3.2)
G2SLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Period 1975 - 2004
Constant 48.33 (26.0) 48.92 (21.1) 91.20 (53.9) 90.80 (49.6)
GDP 0.174 (5.65) 0.180 (6.00)
Labour tax - Nor 0.093 (0.65) 0.096 (0.96) -0.033 (-1.77) -0.051 (-2.02)
Labour tax - Con 0.178 (1.16) 0.471 (3.57) -0.227 (-4.70) -0.191 (-4.09)
Labour tax - Brit 1.875 (9.56) 1.240 (8.10) -0.211 (-2.17) -0.186 (-2.22)
Labour price -0.623 (-37.7) -0.645 (-38.0) -0.135 (-7.15) -0.139 (-7.41)
Transfers -71.05 (-7.38) -55.97 (-5.59) -33.28 (-10.4) -32.32 (-10.3)
Public consumption 162.1 (11.1) 142.1 (9.25) 59.34 (10.2) 58.17 (10.3)
Number of obs 450 450 450 450
R² (within) 0.888 0.885 0.537 0.535
F-test (p-value) 98.69 0.000 67.78 0.000
CHI² 2839 [6] 405.8 [7]
Sub-period 1975 - 1989
Constant 56.41 (37.9) 55.99 (20.7) 78.82 (6.43) 74.59 (4.96)
GDP 0.486 (1.73) 0.562 (1.68)
Labour tax - Nor 0.314 (2.82) 0.141 (1.40) 0.186 (1.83) 0.028 (0.43)
Labour tax - Con -0.274 (-2.33) -0.176 (-1.46) -0.250 (-3.20) -0.104 (-1.08)
Labour tax - Brit 0.086 (0.32) 0.262 (1.29) -0.094 (-0.46) 0.096 (0.43)
Labour price -0.471 (-25.7) -0.466 (-23.8) -0.294 (-3.01) -0.313 (-2.77)
Transfers -40.03 (-3.74) -37.85 (-3.32) -19.09 (-1.42) -18.79 (-1.21)
Public consumption 51.19 (3.35) 49.60 (3.05) 34.62 (2.57) 34.52 (2.11)
Number of obs 225 225 225 225
R² (within) 0.891 0.889 0.473 0.432
F-test (p-value) 265.6 0.000 31.85 0.000
CHI² 1358 [6] 121.7 [7]
Sub-period 1990 - 2004
Constant 47.59 (9.86) 50.54 (10.7) 91.68 (35.8) 89.79 (31.3)
GDP 0.089 (2.02) 0.124 (2.63)
Labour tax - Nor 0.211 (0.95) 0.285 (2.32) -0.336 (-4.71) -0.216 (-3.61)
Labour tax - Con 0.372 (1.27) 0.532 (3.02) -0.008 (-0.90) -0.082 (-1.02)
Labour tax - Brit 2.769 (11.3) 1.615 (8.47) -0.431 (-2.53) -0.275 (-1.71)
Labour price -0.677 (-20.7) -0.706 (-19.9) -0.048 (-1.52) -0.070 (-2.03)
Transfers -2.754 (-0.19) 19.18 (1.36) -26.09 (-5.93) -23.86 (-5.34)
Public consumption 50.21 (2.16) 18.75 (0.82) 46.10 (6.63) 43.39 (6.26)
Number of obs 225 225 225 225
R² (within) 0.813 0.792 0.528 0.517
F-test (p-value) 31.46 0.000 65.88 0.000
CHI² 660.9 [6] 181.0 [7]
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is employment rate. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in parentheses. (3) Degrees of
freedom are presented in square brackets. (4) Column [1]: estimated by OLS with fixed effect. (5) Column [2]: esti-
mated by GLS allowing correlation across countries. (6) Column [3]: estimated by IV with fixed effect. (7) Column
[4]: estimated by IV.
26
Table 5.2 Regression results for employment (dynamic panel data estimation).
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is employment rate. (2) Values of t-ratios are reported in paren-
theses. (3) Column [5]: GMM refers to Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation method. (4) Col-
umn [2]: FD2SLS refers to first-differenced IV estimation method. (5) Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions. (6) Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation of the
differenced errors.
Method Equation (3.1) GMM Equation (3.2) FD2SLS
[5] [6]
Period 1975 - 2004
Employment   0.970 (110.)   0.417 (7.80)
GDP   0.197 (1.86)
Labour tax - Nor  0.019 (0.64)  -0.053 (-1.75)
Labour tax - Con  0.168 (5.01)  -0.024 (-0.57)
Labour tax - Brit  0.250 (6.15)  -0.056 (-0.50)
Labour price  -0.023 (-3.65)  -0.136 (-3.60)
Transfers  -6.659 (-3.48)  -4.093 (-1.75)
Public consumption   14.86 (4.86)   10.37 (2.66)
Number of obs 420 420
R² (within) 0.675
Sargan test  (p-value) 510.8 (0.000)
AR(1) (0.105)
AR(2) (0.000)
CHI²  (p-value) 464.7 (0.000)
Sub-period 1975 - 1989
Employment   0.811 (25.9)   0.397 (7.62)
GDP   0.198 (2.00)
Labour tax - Nor  -0.021 (-0.41)  -0.016 (-0.48)
Labour tax - Con  0.023 (0.43)  -0.060 (-1.06)
Labour tax - Brit  -0.272 (-2.25)  -0.224 (-2.73)
Labour price  -0.081 (-5.32)  -0.131 (-3.99)
Transfers  -22.68 (-6.04)  -5.548 (-1.30)
Public consumption   30.26 (5.75)   11.82 (2.07)
Number of obs 210 210
R² (within) 0.826
Sargan test  (p-value) 147.9 (0.003)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.943)
CHI²  (p-value) 218.7 (0.000)
Sub-period 1990 - 2004
Employment   0.947 (70.3)   0.497 (8.22)
GDP   0.067 (2.80)
Labour tax - Nor  0.027 (0.61)  -0.192 (-2.91)
Labour tax - Con  0.081 (1.40)  0.019 (0.28)
Labour tax - Brit  0.315 (5.26)  -0.037 (-0.18)
Labour price  -0.025 (-2.26)  -0.094 (-3.20)
Transfers  -4.942 (-1.71)  -6.313 (-1.79)
Public consumption   15.78 (3.36)   14.11 (2.42)
Number of obs 210 210
R² (within) 0.693
Sargan test  (p-value) 314.5 (0.271)
AR(1) (0.000)
AR(2) (0.010)
CHI²  (p-value) 240.5 (0.000)
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We note that, for total period by estimating levels allowing scale effects appear, the
negative impact of labour tax rate on the employment is highest in countries, where
trade unions play an important role but are decentralised. This finding supports the idea
that the increase in labour taxation should be most harmful to employment in mid-
centralised countries. However, by using FD2SLS method, the negative impact of la-
bour tax rate on the employment is significant only in countries, where wage bargaining
is centralised. On the contrary, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) suggest that unemployment
is strongly and positively correlated with labour taxation in Europe, but no significant
relationship in countries where bargaining is centralised or co-ordinated.28
Unexpected, scale effects weaken the negative impact of transfers on the employ-
ment. In generally, the coefficients of transfers are higher without integration effect than
by using instruments. However, it is shown that the coefficients of the ratio of transfers
have become greater over integration with scale effects. The coefficients of the ratio of
transfers have expected sign, and they are statistical significant, except some coeffi-
cients for sub-periods. This may reflect the fact that international integration leads a
structural change of social security system, i.e. increasing need for social insurance ar-
rangements to ensure some income stabilization in the presence of cross-country shocks.
While high benefits lead to high unemployment, they also lead to high participation
because they make participation in the labour market more attractive i.e., participation
being necessary to be eligible for the high benefits.
Furthermore, we note that scale effects weaken the positive impact of public con-
sumption on the employment. The coefficient of the ratio of wage-based consumption is
higher without integration effect than by using instruments. Although, it is shown that
the coefficient of consumption have become greater over integration with scale effects,
and decrease with constant output. The coefficients of the ratio of consumption have
expected sign, and they are statistical significant; except, without integration effect, for
last sub-period, this coefficient is by estimating levels statistically insignificant.
28 We estimated the employment equations both of in levels and in first-differences also without labour
costs which are not reported here. These findings support the idea that the increase in labour taxation
should be less harmful to employment in centralised countries.
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Overall, the results provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that economic
integration has contributed the distortion effects of welfare policies on the employment.
While, the results provide some support that scale effects of international integration
strengthen the negative impact of labour tax rate on the employment. Although, scale
effects weaken the negative impact of transfers on the employment, negative impact is
increased over integration. On the other hand, integration weakens the positive impact
of public consumption on the employment.
6  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been twofold to investigate how economic integration
affects the impact of welfare policies on the employment by using theoretical model and
empirical analysis. We consider the possibilities of financing public sector by general
labour taxation in an economy which becomes more integrated in international product
market. We build the theoretical framework for estimating employment and determining
the impact of economic integration on the effects of welfare policies. In a general theo-
retical model of intra-industry trade, we analyzed how economic integration changes the
impact of welfare policies on the employment. A model captures scale effects running
from product markets to the effects of welfare policies on the employment. Increasing
job mobility implies a change in the distortions arising from taxes and social security
contributions levied on labour which affects the possibilities perceive in pursuing wel-
fare policies, i.e. public consumption and social security expenses. We show that the
effects of economic integration on the impact of welfare policies on employment de-
pend definitely trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of
economies of scale. As increased trade competition crowds out better advantage of
economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by
labour taxation.
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We structured the econometric model in which the aim is to determine whether
European integration has changed the impact of welfare policies on the employment
using at a panel of European countries from 1975 to 2004. Our finds provide some sup-
port that scale effects of international integration strengthen the negative impact of la-
bour tax rate on the employment. However, scale effects weaken the negative impact of
transfers on the employment; although, this negative impact increased over integration.
Furthermore, we noted that integration weakens the positive impact of public consump-
tion on the employment. These results provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis
that that economic integration has contributed the distortion effects of welfare policies
on the employment.
Finally, the study points up potentially interesting area for future research. One area
for further research would be to extend the integration model to capture the role of in-
ternational capital flows and, in general, factor substitutions possibilities, i.e. the substi-
tution effects of economic integration to the impact of welfare policies on the employ-
ment. Another point that we left out of discussion is the redistributive welfare policies,
in particular related to fiscal adjustments with redistributions and fiscal reforms. Our
findings have important challenges for policy-making with economic integration impli-
cating concerns the cost of the generous European welfare states.
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